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Policymakers can support a fixed exchange rate  They show that, even for policyniakers with
with various degrees of commitment. A regime  a strong preference for maintaining the fixed
in which countries can devalue unilaterally  exchange rate, there are circumstances under
represents a weaker commitment than one in  which they will choose to devalue. They may
which devaluation must be agreed upon with  choose to do so, for example, when the economy
other parties (as in the European monetary  is hit by an adverse shock and the costs of
system). Full dollarization, understood here as  adhering to the fixed exchange rate are greater
full replacement of the domestic currency by the  than those associated with devaluing.
U.S. dollar, is an extreme commitment to a fixed
exchanged rate - is indeed a special case of a  Their model makes it possible to understand
fixed exchange rate.  why many high inflation economies have not
adopted full dollarization as a way to stabilize
Cukierman, Kiguel, and Liviatan argue that  prices. In emphasizing the cost of reneging, they
the cost of reneging is a key reason policymakers  differ from analysts who single out the desire to
hold back from strong commitments in their  rely on seigniorage as the main motive for
exchange rate policy. The stronger the commit-  stopping short of full dollarization.
ment to an exchange rate rule, the more costly it
is to deviate from it. They develop a Barro-  They argue that strong commitments will be
Gordon type of model in which the policymaker  made only once there is a good chance the
has to decide the degree of commitment under  policymaker will not renege, and by then they
uncertainty.  might not be necessary - a point they illustrate
with examples from Latin American countries.
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I.  Introduction
A fixed  exchange  rate can  be supported  by various  degrees  of
commitment. The gold standard  represents  the strongest  possible  commitment,
in the  sense  that  domestic  money  must  be fully  backed  by gold,  governments
have  no leeway  in setting  the  money  supply,  and changes  in the  parity  are
extremely  rare  events. A currency  board  is a slightly  weaker  commitment,  as
domestic  currency  may be only  partly  backed  by foreign  assets. Similarly,
the  fixed  exchange  rates  regime  under  the  Bretton  Woods  system  was even
weaker,  as central  banks  were not  required  to back the  issuance  of money  with
foreign  assets,  and  devaluations  were accepted  as part  of  the  rules  of the
game (especially  to deal  with external  imbalances).
Fixed  exchange  rates  have  become  a central  component  in  many
disinflation  programs. The successful  stabilization  programs  of Israel
(1985)  and  Mexico (1987)  started  with a fixed  exchange  rate,  and so did  the
less  successful  Austral  plan  in  Argentina  (1985)  and  the  Cruzado  plan in
Brazil  (1986). The  Chilean  stabilization  process  of 1974-82  relied  on a
fixed  exchange  rate  at a late  stage  for  around  three  years. Likewise  Denmark
and Ireland  and other  European  countries  fixed  their  exchange  rates  within
the  EMS.'
I  The first  four  programs  are  described  in Bruno,  Fischer  Helpman  and
Liviatan  (1991). Giavazzi  and  Pagano  (1991)  examine  the  Danish  and  Irish
stabilization  programs.2
An important  difference  among  these  programs  is the strength  of the
commitment  to  the fixed  exchange  rate.  The  weakest  commitment  states  that
the  exchange  rate  will  be fixed  (in  order  to provide  a  nominal  anchor  for  the
stabilization  program),  but  with the implicit  understanding  that the  rule
will be changed  if inflation  persists  (e.g.  in the  Cruzado  plan).  A stronger
commitment  is effected  when the  fixed  exchange  rate is supported  with a
promise  not to  print  money  to finance  the  budget  deficit,  as for  example  in
the  Israeli  program  or the  Austral  Plan.  A third  group  of countries  wVent
further  by supporting  the  fixed  exchange  rate  with a legal  obligation  to back
all  or part of the issuance  of  money  with foreign  assets,  as in the  programs
aimed  at stopping  the  Europeans  hyperinflations  in the 1920s,  or in the 1991
Convertibility  plan in  Argentina  . 2
Full  dollarization,  understood  as complete  substitution  of the  U.S.
dollar  for  the  domestic  currency  as the  only  legal  tender,  is a special  case
of a fixed  exchange  rate.  While  this  regime  has  been Froposed  as a  way to
bring  down inflation,  it  has  not  yet been implemented  in Latin  America  for
this  purpose. A distioctive  feature  of this  arrangement  is that the
government  gives  up the  privilege  to  collect  seigniorage.3 We want to  make
clear  at this  point  that  full  dollarization  can  be abandoned,  in the  same  way
that countries  in the  past renege  from  strong  commitments,  such as during  the
gold standard. During  that  era,  countries  either  suspended  convertibility  of
the  domestic  currency  or alternatively  devalue  the  currency  when facing
severe  external  shocks. In  both cases  the  decisions  implied  reneging  on a
commitment  that  was probably  equivalent  to  what full  dollarization  would  be nowadays.
2  Canavese  (1992)  provides  and  excellent  description  of the
convertibility  program.
3  Panama  is the  only  fully  dollarized  economy  in Latin  America,  but its
original  adoption  was  not related  to an attempt  to stop  high inflation.3
By  making  a stronger  commitment,  a  policymaker  "ties  his  hands"  to a
certain  degree  and  hence  he is more likely  to successfully  affect
inflationary  expectations. The  reason  is that  the  political  costs  of
reneging  from  a given  exchange  rate  regime  are  generally  larger  the tighter
the  commitment  implicit  in that  regime.  As a consequence  the  announcement
of a fixed  exchange  rate  has a stronger  impact  on expectations  when it is
associated  with monetary  institutions  that imply  a stronger  commitment. But,
even  strong  commitments  can  be broken.
This  paper  examines  the considerations  that  policymakers  typically  take
into  account  before  choosing  a commitment  level. We view the  strength  of the
commitment  as being  inversely  related  to the  potential  costs  of reneging  on
it.  An implication  of this  approach  is that  one  explanation  for  not
observing  high inflation  countries  rushing  to full  dollarization  as a  way to
bring  down inflation  is that  policymakers  are  not sufficiently  confident  that
they  can sustain  the  regime  for  a prolonged  time,  especially  because  such
economies  are  prone  to large,  adverse  external  shocks. It is  this concern
that  induces  their  policymakers  to  maintain  national  currencies.
The need to raise  seigniorage  is less important  in our  view.  The
economies  that  are  now  considering  full  dollarization  are those  that are
seriously  trying  to stabilize,  and  hence  are  willing  to eliminate  the  budget
deficit. In addition,  if they  succeed  in stabilizing,  the revenue  from
seigniorage  is likely  to be small  (low  inflation  economies  generally  collect
around  one  percent  of GDP  from seigniorage).  In Argentina  or Brazil,  this
amount  represents  around  3 percent  of revenues  of the  consolidated  public
sector. It is thus  doubtful  that  a serious  stabilizer  will not dollarize
because  he is  worried  about  losing  this relatively  meager  revenue.4
There  are  a number  of reasons  that  can  force  governments  to finally
devalue. In almost  every  case devaluations  are  induced  by balance  of
paymen  s  problems. In some cases  the  external  difficulties  arise  from
inconsistencies  in the design  of the  program,  e.g. the  exchange  rate is
maintained  fixed  while at the  same  there  are significant  budget  deficits
financed  by money creation. In other  cases,  however,  adverse  external  shocks
or unfavorable  domestic  political  developments  are the  main causes  for
reneging  on an announcement. As a result,  in an uncertain  world,  the  ability
to  precommit  is greatly  affected  by the  nature  and distribution  of shocks.
A second  type  of problem  is that  the  public  is typically  uncertain
about  the  extent  to  which the  policymaker  in office  views  his announcement  as
a serious  commitment. Policies  to stabilize  prices  are  put in  place  by
governments  who are  ready  to  pay the  related  costs,  as  well as by those  who
most likely  will abandon  them as soon  as signs  of hardship  show  up.  It is
thus  difficult  to anticipate,  at the  beginning,  what  will be the  response  of
a  policymaker. As a result,  most stabilization  programs  face  adverse
expectations  in  the  sense  that  even a  policymaker  who largely  intends  to be
live  up to his  policy  preannouncements  is  not fully  believed.
The  purpose  of this  paper  is to identify  the  factors  which  determine
the  strength  of commitment  that  policymakers  choose  to back  up a fixed
exchange  rate system. In practice  the  commitment  level  is  achieved  by
choosing  a particular  set  of  monetary  and  exchange  rate  arrangements.
Section  II develops  a Barro-Gordon  type  model  in  which the  pol2cymaker  has to
decide  how  much to commit  under  uncertainty. An important  assumption  is that
the  stronger  the  commitment  to the  fixed  exchange  rate  the  greater  the
political  cost  of reneging  on it.  Thus,  prior  to deciding  on the  choice  of
exchange  rate arrangements  the  policymaker  has to  weigh the  benefits,  to the5
disinflation  program,  from  making  a strong  commitment  against  the  potential
costs  c' .. eing  forced  to renege  on it.  Some  of the  more technical  details
are  presented  in appendices. Section  III illustrates  the  results  of the
model  with examples  from  Latin  American  countries. We conclude  in section  IV
with a comparison  of the results  of our  approach  with related  work.
II.  The  Model
The  model  highlights  the  trade  off  between  credibility  and
flexibility.'  We assume  that  the  policymaker  has some  degree  of freedom  in
determining  the strength  of his  commitment  to a fixed  exchange  rate  policy.
An assertion  such as "the  exchange  rate  is  pegged  to the  dollar  for  the  time
being  but the  policy  will be reexamined  shortly"  is a  weak commitment. A
fixed  exchange  rate  which is a cornerstone  of a  major stabilization  program
(as  in the  Austral  plan in  Argentina)  is  a stronger  commitment.
We shall  model the  uncertainty  about  the seriousness  of the  policy
announcement  by assuming  that  there  are  two  types  of policymakers  - a
dependable  one (D)  who is subject  to a reneging  cost and  an alternative
policymaker  (W)  who is not  bound  by his  policy  announcement. D incurs  a cost
of reneging  which  W does  not.  The  public  has  a prior  probability  (a)  that
the  pol-cymaker  is  D.  This  prior  is  used in forming  expectations.
The objective  functions  of D and  W are given  by a  modified  version  of
the  Barro-Gordon  model.
JD  = x(it-n')-h  2  -bc  (la) 2
'Related  discussions  appear  in Flood  & Isard (1989)  and  Lohmann (1992).6
J2-  (lb)
x2O,  O￿c_l,  h,  b>O.
u-no  denotes  the surprise-devaluation,  i.e.  the  devaluation  in excess  of
what  was expected. By creating  a surprise  devaluation  the  policymaker  can
create  a temporary  real  devaluation,  or a reduction  in real  wages,  which  will
improve  the  trade  balanze. However,  devaluation  (inflation)  as such  is
undesirable,  as is reflected  by the term (_  hU2).
2
If D announces  a fixed  exchange  rate  he also chooses  the  degree  of
conmmitment  c.  The cost  of deviating  from  the  rule is bc,  where  b is a fixed
parameter  that  determines  the size  of the  cost  incurred  by D  when he reneges
on a commitment  of degree  c.  One reason  for  the  existence  of this cost is
that  a broken  commitment  undermines  the  subsequent  dependability  of the
policymaker  (both  in economic  as  well as in  political  terms). This is
something  that  D cares  about  but  W does  not.  Breaking  a commitment  shows  that
the  policymaker  is  unable  to live  by the  rules  which he himself  set.
However,  abiding  to the  rules  is  an essential  input  into  the  reduction  of
long  term inflationary  expectations  (this  goes  beyond  We  in  our  model).  We
interpret  c as the  proportion  of agents  who take  the  exchange  rate
announcement  seriously. We assume  that  the  policymaker  can influence  this
proportion  by the strength  of his  assertion. However,  the  larger  is c the
larger  will be the  cost  of reneging. W does  not incur  any  cost  of reneging.
The  parameter  x  measures  the  relative  importance  that  the  policymaker
attaches  to output  gains  from  surprise  inflation  as compared  with his
aversion  to inflation  (devaluation)  as in the  Barro-Gordon  model. We7
consider  x as  a  being  subject  to shocks  which  may be due either  to external
developments  (a  balance  of payment  crises  may raise  the  preference  for  output
gains)  or to unexpected  changes  in  the  balance  of power  between  groups  which
favor  a reduction  in  unemployment  and those  who attach  greater  importance  to
price  stability.
The interaction  between  the  policymaker  in office  and  the  public  can  be
thought  of as a four-stage  game  which  relates  to a fixed  exchange  rate
regime. First  the  policymaker  chooses  his degree  of commitment  (c)  to the
regime. In the  second  stage  the  preference  parameter  (x)  realizes. In the
third  stage,  after  the  realization  of x, the  public  forms  its  expectation  of
the  rate of devaluation  ne. In the fourth,  and  final,  stage  the  policymaker
picks  the  actual  rate  of devaluation  (n).  If  D does  not renege  nD=O,  and  if
he does  nD>O as  will be seen  later. The following  figure  summarizes  the
timing  of events.
1  2  3  4
Policymaker  x realizes  public  Policymaker
chooses  c  forms  Picks  X
expectations  xc
Note that the  only  thing  which the  public  does  not know in stage  3 is
the  identity  of the  policymaker. The announcement  of c in the first  stage
does  not reveal  the  type  because  W, for  whom the  announcement  is costless,
will always  mimics  D's announcement  (but  not  necessarily  his acts).
To ensure  the  time  consistency  of the  solution  for  D  we start  from  th.e
final  stage  and  work backward  in the  dynamic-programming  fashion. According
to (1)  D will renege  on the fixed  exchange  rate if  his  benefit  from
maintaining  n=O is less  than the  benefit  of adjusting  n optimally  in  view of8
the  realization  of x.  In the  case  of reneging  both  W and  D  will find it
optimal  to set
nw=  hX-  (2)
According  to (1)  D  will renege  if
x  h -tn°) - X2Eh - bc> -Sce x  (3) h  2
which implies  that  reneging  will take  place  when
I
x> (2hbc)  2  = xc()
Hence
O  if  x  s5 xC
AD(x)  =  x>XC(4)
For  any agent  who takes  the  announcement  of the  fixed  exchange  rate
seriously the expected n is  "D  +  (1-a)1t  . We assume that for any other
agent Te  ri-  . Since  the  proportion  of the  former  group  is c, the (average)
expected  N  in the  population  is
n')=  c[anDf  +  (1-a),  -Aj +  -c)  ca,  U  (-c)x.  (5)
Hence




D's  objective  ir stage  1  is as follows:
if  x 5 Xc
JD(X)  X (0-il-ac)  .x)  _ 0  -(l-ac)  xL  (7)
h 2  ~~~h
and if x  >  Xc
JD(x)  = x  (h)  (b  X2  b)  (8)
Hence
Q(c)eEJD(x)  f-(1-ca)  h2 dF(x)  _ f(x2h  + bc)dF(x)  (9)
where F is the  distribution  function  of x and (from  (3'))  XC  (2hbc)  2
We assume,  for  simplicity  the  uniform  distribution  with density  K in
the interval  t0,a],  i.e.  0 :  x <  a.5 The  objective  function  can  then  be
written  as
Q(c)  - - K  1hac)|  x2dx  +  f  (  hx2  b)  (10)
After  some algebra  this reduces  to
aQ(c)  =  -(  2  Xc3  - 6h  + bcx,  - bca.  (11)
A straightforward  calculation  (see  appendix)  shows  that  the second
order  derivative  of Q with respect  to c is always  positive. Hence the
optimal  value  of c occurs  at the  boundary  of its  range,  and  must,  therefore,
5Note  that  aK=l.  It is also  assumed  that  at c=1  x,<a,  i.e.  there  are
values  of x for  which  D will renege.10
be at either c =  0 or c = 1.  This special feature is not an essential part
of the problem.  It is a consequence of the particular density function
chosen.  But since, the main qualitative results of our discussion carry over
to more general cases we illustrate them, for simplicity, by means of the
uniform distribution.
The maximal commitment c=1 arises when Q(1) >  Q(O).  This implies (see
appendix) that there is a commitment when the following inequality holds
A  _  a tQ(l)  - Q(O)J =  (3h 2  XC 3 + b(x,-a))0" 2 (12)
It follows from this inequality that a commitment is more likely to result,
when credibility (a) is higher and when the range of x (i.e. a) is smaller
(since xc  <  a there will be no commitment with  a<l).  This likelihood will
2
also rise with h provided a>  2  (this is a sufficient but not necessary
2
condition).  The effect of a larger b is ambiguous. 6
Let us turn now to the intuition behind these results.
Consider first the effect of a  on commitment.  Viewed from stage I
(before the realization of x) the expected value of We'  (x),  when D is in
office is
Ex  - a  b  wlhen  c  =  1
h  a
E  X7e(X)  =  (13)
Ex  when  c=o
6A larger b enables a stronger commitment, with c=1.  However, it also
increases the risk of paying a high reneging cost in case of an unfavorable
shock.11
where  Ex is the  expected  value  of x (also  equal  to  a).  Hence  by making  a
2
commitment  (setting  c=1)  expectations  are reduced  by a  b.  Thus the larger a
is  a  the larger  the  average  reduction  in inflationary  expectations  that  is
achieved  through  the  commitment  to a fixed  exchange  rate regime.
A similar  calculation  with respect  to rD (the  average  realized  rate  of
devaluation  when D is in  office),  yields
Ex  - b  when  c  = 1
ETD  (X  E=(1x  l(Ex  when  c=  O
Note that (Unlike  to  EnI
6(x)  in equation  (13)  this term  is indepen-
dent  of a.  Hence,  the  larger  is x the  lower  is  a the  lower  is the  average
negative  surprise  inflation  in the  presence  of a commitment  (c=l)  when D is
in  office. From (13)  and (14)  this  surprise  inflation  is given  by
E ~  0 x)--1-a)  czx 07 2
EXID  (X)  - E.Tn' (x)  =  - (  2ah  (15)
Hence  the  larger  is  a  the  larger  the  beneficial  effect  of a commitment  on
unexpected  inflation. On the  cost side,  the  commitment  (with  c=1) implies  an
expected  value  of costs  (viewed  from  stage  1),  through  bc, equal  to bc(a-x,,)
which is independent  of a.  Thus raising  c from  0 to I  leads  to a larger
reduction  in En 6 (x)  when a is larger  but this  consideration  does  not  affect
costs.  This explains  why a higher  reputation  is conducive  to a stronger
commitment.12
It can  be seen  from (12)  that  an ificrease  in 'a'  reduces  the  likelihood
of a commitment. This is so because  a larger  'a'  i.e.  a  wider  range  of
variation  for  x, implies  a higher  expected  cost associated  with reneging.
Note  that an increase  in 'a'  is a simultaneous  increase  both in expected  x
and its  standard  deviation  leaving  the  coefficient  of  variation  constant.
Consequently,  another  way of expressing  the foregoing  result  is by saying
that  an increase  in Ex,  holding  the  coefficient  of variation  constant,  will
reduce  the  tendency  to  make a commitment  on fixing  the  exchange  rate.
The intuition  underlying  the  result  that  a larger  h raises  the
likelihood  of a commitment  is straightforward.  A larger  h means that  the
policymaker  is relatively  more concerned  about  the  costs  of inflation. Since
actual  inflation  is lower  in the  presence  of a commitment  than  in its  absence
(see  equation  (14)),  the  commitment  is  more  valuable  the  larger  is h.
Before  discussing  the  implications  of  the  model  in  more detail,  it is
important  to point  out  some  of its  limitations  for  empirical  analysis  and
ways in  which it  can  be extended. First,  the  fixed  cost of reneging  (c)  is
intended  to  capture  the  inability  of D of revealing  himself  as the  dependable
policymaker  or alternatively  the  costs  of not  being  able  to stick  to
announcements. The  nature  of these  costs  is not  explicit  in  a one period
model  of the  type  used in the  paper,  but it is easy to interpret  them  once  we
extend  the  model to two  periods. If  D reneges  in the  first  period  he is not
revealed  as being  the  dependable  policymaker,  and/or  one  who sticks  to  his
announcements. As a result,  he cannot  reap the  benefits  of a good reputation
in  the second  period. In  much of the  discussion  that  follows  we assume  that
the  results  of the  model can  be extended  to a  multiperiod  framework. Second,
while the  policymaker  is free  to choose  any  value  of c between  0 and 1,  when
we conduct  the  analysis  using  the  uniform  distribution  we find out  that the13
policymaker  will choose  either  full,  or not  commitment  at all. While this is
a restrictive  result,  we show  in appendix  3 that for  a general  distribution
function  it is possible  that  the  policymaker  chooses  an internal  solution.7
Thus in general,  the  policymaker  has  more options  regarding  the  degree  of
commitment  than  what is implied  by the  uniform  distribution  case.  Third,  in
the  model  we assume  that  the  public  has a prior  probability  (a)  that the
policymaker  in office  is D.  While  a  is exogenous  in the  model,  it could  be
endogenized  by including  prior  actions  on the  fiscal  deficit. In practice,
policymakers  do not signal  only on one  front. Instead  they try  to enhance
their  reputation  by making  policy  decisions  in  various  areas.
III.  Practical  Implications  of the  Theory
This section  illustrates  the  practical  implications  of the  model
presented  above  with specific  examples  drawn  from  the experiences  of  Latin
American  countries  during  stabilization  attermpts.  In  particular,  we provide
examples  that  indicate  the  different  degrees  of commitment  in  various
stabilization  programs,  and  show  how  these  commitments  are  related  to some  of
the  variables  suggested  in the  model. We also examine  some  of the  reasons
that  led  policymakers  to renege  on announcements,  and  explore  the  consequent
costs.
i.  Deeree  of Commitment
Policymakers  have a range  of options  regarding  the  type  of exchange
rate  rule that  they announce  to support  stabilization  programs. In some
cases  they announce  a fully  fixed  exchange  rate,  while in others  they  opt  for
7 The full implications  of this  case  need  to be study  in  more detail,
something  that  we plan to do in future  work.14
a preannounced  crawling  peg.  This paper  focusses  on cases  in  which the
policymaker  announces  a fixed  exchange  rate.  The announcement  can be backed
in different  ways.  In some  cases  this  involves  not  printing  money to finance
the  budget  deficit  (while  the  option  of providing  credit  to the  private
sector  is  maintained),  in  others  to issue  money  only to buy foreign  exchange.
Finally,  the  commitment  to the  exchange  rate  rule can  be supported  with full
convertibility  or  with restrictions  on the  capital  or current  account,  in
which  case  a parallel  foreign  exchange  market  usually  develops.  It is
easier  for  policymakers  to stick  to their  exchange  rate  commitment  by
introducing  such  restrictions. However,  when they  follow  such a course  of
action  they damage  their  reputation,  and  reduce  the chances  that  their
policies  will succeed  in the  long  run.
The strength  of commitment  depends  on the combination  of these  three
elements. The  stronger  commitment  corresponds  to cases  where  the exchange
rate  is fixed,  the  monetary  base is fully  backed  by foreign  exchange  and
there  is full  convertibility  of the  domestic  currency. Additional  features
that  one  might  want to consider  for  evaluating  the  seriousness  of the
commitment  to a fixed  exchange  rate regime  are  the  degree  of independence  of
the  central  bank in setting  the  exchange  rate  and/or  monetary  targets,  and
the  conditions  under  which  a devaluation  can  take  place. 8
Empirically,  the  convertibility  plan  launched  in  Argentina  in  March
1991  represents  one  of the  strongest  commitments  made so far  in Latin
America. The central  components  of the  plan  were a fixed  exchange  rate to
the  US dollar,  established  by law  with a ceiling  at 10,000  Australes  per U.S.
Dollar,  and an obligation  to  print  money only  to purchase  foreign  exchange.
8  There is some  evidence  suggesting  that,  other  things  the  same,
inflation  is lower  in  countries  whose central  banks  preannounce  monetary
targets  (Cukierman  (1992)  chapter  20, section  5).15
There  was full  convertibility  of the  domestic  currency  as all restrictions  on
external  payments  were eliminated. Legally,  the  monetary  base  had to be 100%
backed  by foreign  assets,  although  part of this (around  10%)  could  be public
debt  denominated  in foreign  currency  valuated  at  market  prices. A key
element  in enhancing  the  strength  of the  arrangement  was the inability  of the
central  bank to devalue,  since  this  action  required  Congressional  approval.
Examples  of  weaker  commitments  are  fixed  exchange  rates  of the  type
used in the  Krieger  Vassena  stabilization  program  in  Argentina  in 1967,  and
in  Chile starting  in  June 1979,  when the  administration  fixed  the  Peso at $39
per  U.S. dollar. 9 In  both cases,  there  was a strong  commitment  to the fixed
exchange  rate,  in the  sense  that  the exchange  rate  was a symbol  of overall
nominal  stability. In addition,  there  were essentially  no restrictions  on
the  current  and the  capital  account  (evidence  of this  was a  very small  or
non-existent  parallel  foreign  exchange  market). On the  other  hand, in these
two instances  the  central  bank  maintained  control  of exchange  rate  policy,
and  there  was no legal  requirement  to back  domestic  currency  with foreign
assets.
The fixed  exchange  rate  announced  in the  Austral  plan and in the 1985
Israeli  program  were examples  of even  weaker  commitments.  The authorities
announced  a fixed  exchange  rate  and  promised  not to  print  money to finance
the  deficit. However,  it  was not  clear  how  long  the  exchange  rate  would
remain  fixed,  and the  limitations  on printing  money  were not supported  by
strong  legislation.
Finally,  the  announcements  of a fixed  exchange  rate  in the  Cruzado  plan
in  Brazil  and  in the  various  programs  that  followed  it,  as well as those  that
9  De Pablo  (1972)  examines  the  Krieger  Vassena  program  while the
Chilean  experience  in analyzed  in  Corbo (1985)  and  Edwards  and  Edwards  (1987)
among  others.16
followed  the  Austral  plan in  Argentina  represent  cases  of very  weak
commitment. Policymakers  did  not tie  their  hands  in any  way, and  it  was
clear  from the  outset  that their  main objective  was to halt  an inflationary
acceleration  rather  than  to bring  about  permanent  price  stability.
In Europe,  during  the  end  of the  eighties  some  members  of the  EMS like
Italy  and France  became  strong  supporters  of a European  monetary  union.
Since  the same  countries  previously  had a clear  preference  for  national
monetary  flexibility  their  support  of a monetary  union  constitutes  a  marked
shift  towards  a preference  for  a stronger  commitment  to fixed  exchange
rates.  °
ii.  What Explains  the  Degree  of Commitment?
The  model developed  in the  previous  section  indicates  that the  degree
of commitment  preferred  by policymakers  depends  on the  direct  costs  of
reneging  (b),  the  distribution  of the shock  x as characterized  by its  upper
bound,  'a',  the  aversion  to inflation  (h),  and the  prior  that  the  public  has
regarding  whether  the  government  is dependable  or  weak (a). A casual  look  at
stabilization  experiences  in Latin  America  indicates  that  these  are  useful
parameters  for  explaining  the  flexibility  of exchange  rate  policy.
The discussion  of the  previous  subsection  implies  that  the  Argentine
stabilization  attempts  can  be ranked  in terms  of their  degree  of commitment
to a fixed  exchange  rate  in the  following  manner: First,  the  Convertibility
Program  (1991);  second,  the  Krieger  Vassena  plan (1967);  third,  the  Austral
plan (1985),  and fourth,  those  that  follow  the latter. What explains  those
different  commitment  levels?
'"Chapter  6 of Cukierman  (1992)  shows  that from  the  point  of view of an
individual  country  replacement  of the  EMS by a monetary  union  constitutes  a
stronger  commitment.17
When the  Convertibility  plan  was launched  the  overall  situation  was
ripe for  a strong  stabilization  program. The fiscal  position  had improved  in
1990,  when the  government  maintained  a modest  primary  surplus  and  a much
lower  overall  budget  deficit  than in  previous  years. Without  question,  in
early  1991  the  country  enjoyed  the  strongest  fiscal  balance  of the  preceding
20 years.'"  Since  the  possibility  of maintaining  a sound  fiscal  position
was also  better  than in previous  years  it  was  probably  easier  to convince  the
public  that the  policymaker  would  stick  to  his commitment.
A second  important  consideration  was the  public's  demand  for  price
stability  as a result  of the  tremendous  costs  associated  with the  previous
hyperinflation. The fact  that  agents  were more  willing  to  make concessions
strengthened  the  position  of the  government  and in this  sense  it  made it  more
likely  to be of the  dependable  type;  in  terms  of the  model,  it could  be
argued  that  both  a  and  h had increased. The  government  certainly  had
increased  its  reputation  prior  to March  1991,  as it had  already  taken
numerous  structural  measures  aimed  at demonstrating  a  break from  the  past.
Particularly  important  in this  respect  were the  privatization  of  public
sector  enterprises,  policies  to reduce  the  size  of the  public  sector  and to
reduce  government  intervention  in the  markets. Finally,  the  potential  costs
of an adverse  external  shock  were dampened  by the fact  that  the  country  was
running  a record  high trade  surplus. This  provided  a large  enough  cushion  to
withstand  a deterioration  in the  terms  of trade  or a temporary  increase  in
imports  characteristic  of exchange  rate  based  stabilizations  (in  other  words,
'a'  was considered  to be small  by policymakers).
1  Of course,  the  fiscal  situation  was  not strong  enough  as to erase
any  doubts  of a reversal. Nevertheless,  on an ex-ante  basis  the  program  had
a reasonable  chance  of success.18
If one  compares  the initial  conditions  with those  in the  Austral  plan,
it is clear  that  the situation  was more fragile  in the latter  case,  and  hence
the  probability  of reversal  was larger. Although  the  budget  deficit  was
reduced  from  16 to 5 percent  of  GDP, the  deficit  was larger  than  prior  to the
convertibility  plan,  while  much of the  reduction  in the  deficit  was based  on
temporary  measures. This indicates  that  there  were probably  more doubts  as
to  whether  the  policymaker  was of the  dependable  type (a  was probably  much
smaller  than in  the convertibility  program).
In between  these  two  programs  lies  the  Krieger  Vassena  plan,  which
was unquestionably  the  most serious  stabilization  attempt  prior  to the
-onvertibility  plan.  The  commitment  to the  fixed  exchange  rate  was strong  in
the  sense  that  when they fixed  it at 350  pesos  to the  dollar  (after  an
initial  40%  devaluation)  it  was viewed  as a symbol  that  would  measure the
success  or failure  of the  program  (much  in  the same  way as in the 1991
convertibility  plan). A relevant  question  is  why didn't  the authorities  tie
their  hands  further  by adopting  full  convertibility?  After  all, the fiscal
balance  was  probably  as strong  as it ever  had  been,  while the  economy  was
enjoying  a relatively  comfortable  external  position.
There  are  two  possible  explanations  for  stopping  short  of full
convertibility  in the  Krieger  Vassena  program. The first  one is that it  was
implemented  during  the  Bretton  Woods  era  in  which full  convertibility  was
considered  as unnecessarily  restrictive. A commitment  of this  type  was
simply  not considered  within  the  feasible  set  of policy  options. Second,  the
overall  economic  situation,  especially  the initial  rate  of inflation,  was
much  more  manageable  in the 60s  than  more recently. This  means that  b, the
fixed  cost associated  with reneging  from  a commitment  was smaller,  while  h,19
the  aversion  to inflation  was  higher. So even for  the  same  a and 'a'  it  was
still  rational  to  commit  strongly  through  a fixed  exchange  rate.
A related  issue  is  why  was the  commitment  weak in the  programs  that
followed  the  Austral  plan?  The typical  program  implemented  between  1986  and
1989 (including  the  Bunge  and  Born plan  to stop  hyperinflation)  was based  on
a fixed  exchange  rate,  supported  by price  and  wage controls,  but a relatively
small  fiscal  effort  (usually  temporary  increases  in revenues). The state  of
the  underlying  fundam.ntals  made such  a  weak commitment  reasonable. The
large  budget  deficits  could  be reduced  only temporarily  through  increases  in
public  sector  prices  and the  levying  of emergency  taxes.  In addition,  the
country  had  a  weak external  position  with limited  access  to external
financing. Finally,  there  was a large  quasi-fiscal  deficit,  much of it
driven  by high interest  rates,  which  was almost  automatically  monetized.
Since,  under  those  circumstances  even small  shocks  could  destabilize  the
program, policymakers  avoided  strong  commitments.
Finally,  an interesting  question  is  why didn't  Peru,  a country  that
like  Argentina  experienced  a hyperinflation  and  which  has gone  through  a
similar  stabilization  process,  adopt  a convertibility  program. The
stabilization  program  in  Peru  was launched  in  August  1990  in response  to a
drastic  and  long  hyperinflation.  This  was an orthodox  money  based  program,
similar  to the  one that  successfully  stopped  hyperinflation  in Bolivia  in
1985.  The results  in Peru  have been  mixed. Hyperinflation  stopped  but
inflation  has remained  stubborn  at around  5 percent  per  month.  Although  the
government  has  been successful  in securing  a balanced  budget  on a cash  basis
the  stabilization  effort  still  faces  large  risks. That  could  explain  why the
exchange  rate  commitment  has been  weak so far.  The  model  predicts  that  the
larger  the  probability  of adverse  shocks  (the  larger  is a),  the  less likely20
it is that  the policymaker  will  make a strong  commitment  to a fixed  exchange
rate.  While the  stabilization  program  has  been  moderately  successful,  it
certainly  continues  to be extremely  fragile. On the fiscal  side,  government
revenues  are  very low (around  8 percent  of  GDP),  a level  which is  not enough
to sustain  the  necessary  level  of current  and  capital  expenditures. In
addition,  the  external  situation  continues  to  be fragile. While  Peru has
restored  the dialogue  and/or  entered  into  negotiations  with the  multilateral
organizations  and the  commercial  banks,  it is still  far from  receiving
voluntary  lending  from  the  private  sector. These  two  weakness  of the  program
probably  generate  enough  uncertainty  so as to prevent  the  government  from
feeling  sufficiently  secure  to  make a strong  commitment  such  as full
convertibility.
The fact that  so far  Peruvian  authorities  have relied  primarily  on
tight  money and  have avoided  entirely  using  the  exchange  rate  as a nominal
anchor  is in itself  an indication  that  they  consider  the  potential  costs  of
reneging  on an exchange  rate  announcement  as high --  even for  a relatively
weak commitment. Hence  they  probably  consider  that  before  entering  this
phase  the  external  and fiscal  conditions  need to be in  much better  shape.
In terms  of the  model  a  is low  and 'a'  high.  Both features  tend to
discourage  the  use of the  exchange  rate as a  nominal  anchor.
iii.  When to Renege  on a  Commitment?
One feature  common  to  many exchange  rate  based  programs  is that
policymakers  tend to stick  to the  fixed  exchange  rate  even  past the  point  at
which it  becomes  clear  that  a devaluation  is  necessary. It seems  that  the
perceived  cost of deviating  from  the  rule  creates  an incentive  to stick  with
the  policy  even if this  implies  a bigger  cost at a later  stage.21
One  example  of this  type is the  period  of a fixed  exchange  rate in
Chile  in the late  seventies  and  early  eighties. In 1978  the  Chilean
authorities  started  to  preannounce  the  exchange  rate  and gradually  reduced
the  announced  rate  of devaluation  as part  of their  strategy  to reduce
inflation. In June 1979,  in response  to the slow  pace  of inflation  reduction
(which  was still  running  above  35 percent  per  year),  the  authorities  fixed
the  exchange  rate at $39  per  US dollar. This  was presented  as a strong
commitment  to the  stabilization  program,  with the idea  that the  exchange  rate
would remain  fixed  for  the foreseeable  future. While inflation  slowed  down
in response  to the  new  policy,  it  remained  well above  international  levels
and  resulted  in a strong  real  appreciation. In 1981,  there  were clear  signs
of looming  problems. The  current  account  deficit  had increased  to around  17
percent  of GDP,  well above  sustainable  levels,  while real  interest  rates
reached  58 percent,  mainly  because  the  private  sector  was already
anticipating  a devaluation.
The  devaluation  finally  came in  June 1982,  in  response  to a severe
deterioration  in  the  balance  of  payments  prompted  in part  by a sharp  fall  in
the  price  of a copper,  and  a tightening  in foreign  lending. It now seems
clear  that  earlier  action  on the  exchange  rate  would  have reduced  the large
costs  associated  with the  drastic  real  appreciation  and  the  ensuing
depreciation  (which  are  discussed  in section  III.iv). However,  the
authorities  chose  to  wait and instead  only  devalued  when forced  to do so  by
the  size of the  external  shocks.
The  Chilean  experience  fits  very nicely  with the  predictions  of the
model. When they  made the  initial  commitment  in 1979,  they  probably
considered  the  parameter  b to be large,  and  they chose  to make the strong
commitment  because  the  prior  was that  they  were perceived  as a strong22
government  (a  was estimated  to be high). However,  once they  established  the
strong  commitment  it  was extremely  difficult  to deviate  from  it,  probably
because  the  anticipated  cost of this  action  was very large. They  would only
deviate  from  it once it became  clear  that  there  was no other  reasonable
option. As a result  they  over-extended  the  period  of the  fixed  exchange  rate
and  made things  worse in the  longer  term.
It is interesting  to  note that  we also  observe  an over-extension  of the
period  of fixed  exchange  rates  even  in programs  where the commitment  is  weak.
A clear  example  of this  type is the  Brazilian  Cruzado  plan of February  1986,
where  a program  based  on a fixed  exchange  rate  and  a wage and  price freeze
was implemented  to stop  high rates  of inflation  (in  excess  of 20 percent  per
month). The Cruzado  plan quickly  ran into  difficulties,  as reflected  in a
sharp  depreciation  of the  Cruzado  in the  parallel  market,  the existence  of
widespread  shortages  of goods  which led  to the  emergence  of black  markets,
and a deterioration  in the  trade  balance. In spite  of these  symptoms  the
government  maintained  its  policies,  and only  changed  them  after  the November
election  took  place.  Once again,  the  explanation  for  not taking  earlier
action  on the  exchange  rate  was that  there  was a cost (c),  in this  case
political,  on reneging  on the  announcement." 2
iv.  The  Costs  of,  and the  Reasons  for  Deviating  from  a Fixed  Exchange  Rate
Rule
12  The stabilization  program  implemented  in Uruguay  in 1967  provides
another  example  of a case  where the  fixed  exchange  rate  was maintained  longer
than  was reasonable  because  of the  political  cost of reneging  on a
preannouncement.  The authorities  ultimately  devalued  but  only after  the  1971
election. As in the  recent  Cruzado  program,  the  parallel  rate  had
depreciated  significantly  well before  the  devaluation,  and the  symptoms  of
overvaluation  were felt  economy-wide. This  episode  is analyzed  in Viana
(1989)  among  others.23
It is difficult  to identify  and  measure  precisely  the  costs  of reneging
once  an announcement  is  made.  What the  model  of the  previous  section
indicates  is that these  costs  increase  with the  strength  of the  commitment.
We will now illustrate  the  nature  and  magnitude  of the  costs  involved  in
departing  from  an announced  rule.
The  Chilean  devaluation  of June 1982  illustrates  some of the costs  that
can  be associated  with over-extending  the  period  of the  fixed  exchange  rate
and then  effecting  a late  maxi-devaluation.  By and large,  the  main costs
were a steep  recession  (output  fell  by 14  percent  in 1982),  a financial
crisis,  and  a sharp  increase  in the  fiscal  deficit  as a result  of subsidies
provided  to firms  and  the  financial  system  to offset  the effects  of the
devaluation.
The 1982  recession  was the largest  one  in Chile  since  the  depression  of
the  thirties. Although  part of it  can  be explained  by the  adverse  external
shocks  of 1981-82,  domestic  factors  were probably  equally  (if  not  more)
important  in this  case.13  There  was a tightening  of domestic  policies
starting  in the second  half  of 1981,  which  were adopted  with the  intention  of
reducing  domestic  prices  and improving  the  balance  of  payments. A second
cost  was the large  financial  crisis  caused  by the  extremely  high (ex-post)
real interest  rates  during  the  years  that  preceded  the  devaluation. A third
important  cost  resulted  from  the  government  provision  of a host of (post
devaluation)  subsidies  to compensate  agents  that  had  contracted  loans  in
foreign  currency. While  this  was extremely  costly  to the  public  sector,  one
could  argue  that it  was not  entirely  unreasonable  since  those  loans  were
originally  taken  on the  basis  of a given  rule (that  the  government  would
13  Minister  Luders  argued  at the time  that  approximately  two  thirds  of
the  recession  was caused  by domestic  policies.24
stick  to the  fixed  exchange  rate  rule). Once the  government  reneged  on its
rule  and  devalued,  domestic  borrowers  suffered  a large  capital  loss. 1"
Since  the  government  could  not distinguish  between  agents  that  had borrowed
fully  believing  the  announcement  and  those  which did  not,  an argument  was
created  for  compensating  all  borrowers. In any case,  the  costs  of these
policies  were extremely  onerous  to the  public  sector.
In Chile,  these  losses  were absorbed  by the  central  bank,  and  appear  in
the quasi-fiscal  deficit. Marshall  and Schmidt-Hebbel  (1991)  present
estimates  of these  deficits  for  the 1982-85  period. These  losses  averaged  10
percent  of GDP  during  those  years. A decomposition  of these  losses  indicate
that  the  main factors  were loan  subsidies  to  bankrupt  financial  institutions,
and  losses  arising  from  exchange  rate  guarantees.
The sheer  size  of the  costs  of sticking  for  too  long  to the  fixed
exchange  rate in  Chile  indicates  that indeed  they are  positively  correlated
with the  strength  of the  commitment. Interestingly,  while Chile  suffered
large  output  and fiscal  losses,  the  stubbornness  with  which the  government
adhered  to the  exchange  rate  rule  had  one  benefit:  the  crisis  did not lead  to
a resurgence  of high inflation  later  on, in fact  inflation  has remained
moderate  (at  around  20 percent  per year)  ever since.
The  Argentine  devaluation  of 1970,  which  marks the  end  of the
stabilization  attempt  started  under  Krieger  Vassena  is a second  example  of
reneging  on a strong  commitment. The devaluation  (25  percent)  was a clear
indication  that  the low  rates  of inflation  that  the  program  was aiming  at
were probably  out  of reach. As in Chile,  by the  time  the  devaluation  was
14  On the  other  hand one  could  argue  that  domestic  agents  could  have
anticipated  that  the government  would  not stick  to the fixed  exchange  rate
since  the  external  imbalance  was unsustainable. If this  was  the case,  the
government  should  have  compensated  less for  the  effect  of the  devaluation.25
effected  (June  1970)  it  was already  clear  that  the  program  was  not
sustainable. Krieger  Vassena  was forced  to  resign  in 1969  as a result  of
labor  unrest,  primarily  in Cordoba,  an industrial  city.  His successor,
Dagnino  Pastore,  initially  adhered  to the  exchange  )ate  policy  but eventually
was forced  to devalue. This  was a critical  turning  point  in economic  policy,
as it  marked  the  beginning  of a long  period  of lax  fiscal  management  and  high
inflation. The short  term effects  of the  devaluation  were an increase  in
inflatica  from 7  percent  in 1969  to 35  percent  in 1971.  But  more important
than  this short  term costs  (which  clearly  meant  a reversal  for  the  original
program)  was the fact  that  agents  were left  with the  perception  that  price
stability  was a difficult  goal to reach. The fact  that  an authoritarian
government  was forced  to back  up from  a strong  commitment  reduced  the  chances
that the  ensuing  administrations  would  attempt  such  a daring  policy.
Finally,  it is useful  to try  to evaluate  the  costs  of reneging  from  a
weak commitment. Are they indeed  smaller? If  we consider  the  period  of the
1985-1989  period  in  Argentina  and  1986-90  in  Brazil,  what  we observe  is a
series  of stabilization  programs  in  both  countries  (the  first  ones being  the
Austral  plan in Argentina  and  the  Cruzado  plan in Brazil)  where the  fixed
exchange  was perceived  as a temporary  device  to generate  transitory  price
stability." The large  reliance  on income  policies  in  these  programs,
especially  in the follow-ups  to  the  original  plans,  was an indication  of
their  weakness. The  analysis  in  Kiguel  and  Liviatan  (1991)  indicates  that in
contrast  to Chile,  the  failure  of the successive  plans  did  not  produce  large
costs  in terms  of output  losses  (certainly  nothing  like in  Chile). On the
other  hand,  the  continuous  failure  to bring  down inflation  for  long  periods
I5  Kiguel  and  Liviatan  (1991)  provide  a fuller  discussion  of these
programs.26
increased  nominal  instability,  eventually  leading  to a full  blown
hyperinflation  in Argentina  and  a short  one in  Brazil. All in all, one  ends
up  with the  impression  that indeed  reneging  on  weaker  commitments  have
smaller  real  costs.
IV.  Concluding  Remarks
The central  message  of this  paper  is that the  cost of reneging  is a  key
reason  that  holds  policymakers  back  from  making  strong  commitments  on their
exchange  rate  policy. The stronger  the  commitment  to an exchange  rate rule,
the  more difficult  it is to deviate  from it.  The  ability  to stick  to
preannounced lules  depends  not  only  on the intentions  of the  policymakers  but
also on the  type  and size  of shocks  which  affect  the  economy. When the
economy  is hit  by a large  shock  it  may be optimal  to deviate  from the  rule
even  for  a policymaker  that is  serious  about  the  rule.
Exchange  rate rules  have been  particularly  important  in disinflation
programs. In those  cases  the  announcement  of a fixed  exchange  is intended  to
reverse  inflationary  expectations  and  convince  the  public  that  prices  are
going  to stabilize. The  policymaker  (especially  if he is serious  about
bringing  down  inflation)  attempts  to stick  to the  rule for  as long  as
possible  in order  to convince  the  public  about  his determination  to
disinflate. However,  in  doing  that  he losses  the  ability  to use the  exchange
rate  to offset  external  shocks. As a consequence  the  use  of exchange  rate
rules  as instruments  of stabilization  also  involves  costs.
Full  dollarization,  an option  that  has  been  considered  as a possible
device  for  stabilizing  high inflation,  is  one  of the  strongest  forms  of
commitment. By accepting  full  dollarization,  and  hence  giving  up the27
domestic  currency,  the  policymaker  forgoes  two  benefits:  first,  the  capacity
to obtain  seigniorage,  and second,  the  ability  to devalue. Much of the
existing  literature  emphasizes  the  first  one,  we will argue  that  the second
one  is at least  as important,  if  not  more.
Fischer  (1982)  argues  that seigniorage  is an important  source  of public
revenues  in developing  countries. In  Argentina,  for  example,  seigniorage  has
been fluctuating  between  3 and  6 percent  of GDP  during  the seventies  and
eighties. Is revenue  from  seigniorage  a strong  enough  reason  to stop  short
of dollarization  if a policymaker  is  willing  to stabilize? Probably  not.  If
a policymaker  is truly  committed  to stabilization  --in the sense  of bringing
down inflation  to one  digit--  then  he  must also  be ready  to  take the fiscal
measures  to ensure  the  sustainability  of the  program. Given  that seigniorage
in low inflation  economies  net  around  1  percent  of GDP, if full  dollarization
is one  of the  few  ways to ensure  long  term  price  stability  thelL  it is
difficult  to argue  that  this  revenue  is the  main consideration  for  not
dollarizing. A determined  government  should  be willing  and  able  to increase
revenues  or reduce  expenditures  by this  relatively  small  amount.
The  model developed  in this  paper  provides  an alternative  explanation
for  stopping  short  of such  a strong  commitment. Policymakers  are  concerned
that  even strong  commitments  may have to be broken  sometimes  (when  shocks  are
sufficiently  large),  and that  there  are costs  associated  with such a course
of action. The debt  crisis,  the  accompanying  higher  interest  rates  and the
deterioration  in the  terms  of trade  periodically  experienced  by some  Latin
American  countries  is the  type  of shock  that  can lead  to reneging  on a
commitment. In the 1982  crisis  in  Chile,  these  shocks  were handled  through  a
devaluation  of the  domestic  currency,  and even  in that  case there  was a
severe  recession. An open  question  is  how the  Chilean  government  would  have28
handled that crisis if it had chosen full dollarization and what would have
been the costs in that case?  A stronger commitment such as dollarization
would have triggered two opposing effects.  On one hand, by reducing
inflationary expectations further, it would have prevented some of the real
appreciation, thus reducing some of the cost of sticking to the commitment.
On the other hand, the Chilean government would probably have adhered to the
commitment for a longer time in the face of the adverse external shocks.
This would have increased costs.  Thus the overall effect of the stronger
commitment on costs is ambiguous.  But it  is likely that in its presence
devaluation would have been postponed even further.  Nonetheless, one cannot
rule out the possibility that the authorities would ultimately have reneged
even under full dollarization.
Many economists believe that revenue from seigniorage is the main
argument for maintaining a national currency.  Others claim that issues
related to national pride are also important (and they probably are).  In our
view, an equally  (if  not more) important motive for stopping short of full
dollarization are the difficulties and costs of reneging on such a commitment
when the country faces large adverse shocks, whose adverse effects can be
alleviated, at least temporarily, by a devaluation.29
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Appendix
1.  Derivation  of a condition  for  the  emergence  of a commitment. The
expected  value of D's  objective  function  in stage  1 (equation  [10])  is given
by
=eD  f  |-  (1-ac)  h f(x)dx  - 2h  +  bc)f(x)dx  (A-2)
0  X
Using  the  uniform  distribution  over the  range [O,a]  with density  f(x)  K, so
that  ak=I,  we can  write (A-1)  as (equation  [113)
(-ac)
ap(c)  =-_  2  X  3 - 6ha3+  bcxC  - bca  (A-2) ag(c)  3h  -6h 
1  ~~~~~~~~~~~3
Since XC  (2hbc)  we have a(O)  6ah  Hence
a(p(l)  - Q(°)  =  Xci3+  bx0,  - ba
(A-3)
where xC  (2bh)  2 is the  value of xC  at c=1.
2.  Demonstration  that the  optimal  c is  always  at a corner.
Differentiating  (A-2)  with respect  to c  we obtain
aaQ(c)  -a-  (  X02  aX7  +  -hX-3  + bx,  (A-4)
ac  2  a  3h 
+ bc  ax-  -ba
ac31
Note that  a  =  hbx;-'.  Substituting  in (A-4)  and rearranging  we obtain
aaQ(c)  -acbx4  +  .x  +  b(x-  (A-5)
ac  3h  (~~
Since  xC is an increasing function of c this  expression  increases  in c.
Hence  the  second  partial  derivative  with respect  to c is positive  for  all
c>O.  This implies  corner  solutions  at c=O  or c=1.  Thus (A-3)  is the  only
relevant  criterion  for  determining  c.
3.  Extension  to the  case  of a general  density  function  and  the existence
of an internal  solution
From  equation  (9)  with h  b =  1  we have
Q(c)=  (1-ac)  x 2 dF(x)  -J  (x2  +c)  dF(x)  (A-6)
where  xC  =  (2c)2 . The first  order  condition  for  optimality  is
Q'(C)  =|Cax2  dF(x)-(l-ac)  (2c)  2 f(xc)  f|  dF(x)+(2c)  2  f(x 0)  = O
where  f  =  dF(x)  is  the  density  function. This can  be simplified  to
dx
Q'(c)  =  a  x 2dF(x)  -f  dF(x)  + (2c)  cf(x 0 )  a =  . (A-7)
It can  be seen that  all  the  expressions  in  Q'(c)  are  increasing  in  c
except  for f(x 0) which  may be decreasing. Since  in general  f' can  be changed
arbitrarily  for  a given  f and a given  xC  there  generally  exist  distributions
that  yield  an internal  solution  (o  < c  < 1)  for  c.  Such solutions  always32
occur  on a downward  sloping  portion  of the  density  function,  i.e.,  where f'  <
o and  Q"(c)  <  o.
Since  Q'  is increasing  in a, it follows  from the  second  order  condition
that  an increase  in  a  raises  c (as  in the  text).  Note  also that  a shift  in
the  probability  mass to the  right  of xc  reduces  Q'(c)  which  means that  it
decreases  the  optimal  c.  This is the  equivalent  result  to that  of an
increase  in 'a'  in the  uniform  distribution  as  discussed  in  the text.Policy Research Working Paper Series
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